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Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political
economy approach which explains the characteristics of Social Secu-
rity Systems. This approach is based on the Single-Mindedness The-
ory (SMT), which assumes that the more single-minded groups are
able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments and eventu-
ally obtain what they ask. Governments are seen as voting-maximizer
policy-makers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG
model and a probabilistic voting approach, I analyse a society divided
into two groups, the old and the young, which only differ for their
preferences for leisure. I show that, to win elections, the Government
sets the marginal tax rates taking into account the numerosity and the
density of groups; eventually, the old receive a positive transfer, whose
burden is entirely borne by the young. Furthermore, the more single-
minded group (the old) is taxed with higher tax rates; this result can
be explained by the necessity that the old have to find a way out to
solve a free-riding problem amongst its members. Indeed, higher tax
rates induce the old to retire earlier, so that retirees may have more
time to participate in political activities and support the old group’s
goals.
JEL Classification: D31, D72, J22, J26
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We work in order to have leisure (Aristotle)
1 Introduction
The stylized facts which refer to the workers’ behavior in the U.S. labor
market show that the participation to the labor force of the older persons
has been increasingly declining over the last century. If the labor force
participation of men age 65-69 was around 60% in the 50’s, the same figure
had fallen to 26% in the 90’s. In many OECD countries, workers withdraw
from the labor market well before the official retirement age. Eventually,
this long-term decline associated with an increase in the life expectation
has led to a considerable increase in the retirement years. Otherwise, the
Government expenditure for Social Security has been skyrocketing and so
has been the percentage of workers covered by the System. This situation
runs into risk to become financially unsustainable over the next years, unless
Governments undertake the structural reforms of Social Security Systems
as required by many economists (see Feldstein & Liebman [15] among the
others).
Over the last few years, the economic literature has been trying to give
plausible explanations to this strong change in the old workers’ lifestyle.
According to an OECD survey ([34]) financial incentives embedded into
public pensions and other assistance schemes pull old workers into retire-
ment. Nevertheless, the OECD makes a distinction among the pull factors
of retirement and the push factors of retirement. The former include all
those financial benefits that incentive workers to anticipate their retirement
age while the latter refer to negative perceptions by old workers about their
capacity or productivity and to socio-demographic characteristics.
In this paper I take the distance from the OECD’s vision, which considers
financial benefits as a pull factor of retirement. Otherwise, referring to the
single mindedness theory, I suggest that preferences of workers (especially
the old) for leisure shape the modern Social Security Systems characteristics.
Thus, behind the generosity of the transfer by Governments there is a precise
political mechanism, driven by individuals who use their power of influence
over the Government to obtain what they need to finance their leisure.
I use an OLG model which considers a society divided into two groups
of workers: the old and the young. Furthermore, I assume that there is a
political competition among two parties which aim to maximize the share
of votes and have to decide an optimal policy vector which encompasses the
labor marginal tax rate and the optimal transfers among cohorts.
The core assumption of the model is based on the concept of “single
mindedness”, defined as the ability of a social group to be focused on a
single issue rather than many. The theory was introduced by Mulligan &
Sala-i-Martin [32] who assumed that the old have more needs for leisure
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than the young and this necessity would explain why the the old require
(and obtain) generous pensions transfer by Government and why the Social
Security expenditures in the U.S. have been increased so much over the last
decades. They adopted an OLG model with a society divided into old and
young workers and showed that
retired elderly can concentrate on issue that relate only to their
age such as the pension or the health system
while the young have to choose among
age-related and occupation issues
Eventually, they concluded,
the elderly are politically powerful because they are more sin-
gle minded and (. . . ) more single minded groups tend to vote
for larger social security programs that benefit them and induce
further retirement.
Thus, according to this theory, there would exist in the economy a group,
the old workers, which have a sort of political superpower and that enables
it to dictate the optimal taxation and transfers system, both for the young
and for the old workers (a sort of tyranny of the elder or “Gerontocracy”,
to quote the author).
Indeed, neither Demographics nor the need for an assistance would ex-
plain the skyrocketing increase in the Governments’ expenditure for Social
Security Systems and the broad reduction in retirement age over the last
decades, but preferences of the old for leisure would provide a more suitable
explanation to this upward trend.
Over the recent years, economists like Profeta [35] have attempted to
formalize the single mindedness theory but, unfortunately, the empirical
evidence does not seem to provide robust support, at least with reference to
the U.S. reality. In a recent work, Diamond [12], in an attempt to describe
the linkage between the Social Security System and the retirement in the
U.S., wrote in his conclusions:
there is clear evidence from both previous work (. . . ) that the
broad structure of the SS program influences retirement timing.
Evidence on the effects of variation in the benefits provided by
this program is less clear, however.
Furthermore, Sala-i-Martin himself recognized that the “Gerontocracy
models”can be applied mostly to the U.S. society, where powerful lobbies
have a great influence on the Government’s decisions; for instance, the Amer-
ican Association of Retired People was evaluate by Fortune to be the most
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influencing lobby of the U.S.. Otherwise, in the European contest, it seems
that an analogue power of influence is exerted by labor unions.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model; section
3 presents a variant of the basic model represented by an altruistic model
where the old generation takes care to the wealth of the young generation;
section 4 provides some empirical evidence, section 5 concludes.
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2 The basic model
I consider an OLG model, where individual agents live only for two periods:
the first period t represents the present and the second t+ 1 represents the
future. At time t there are two generations coexisting together: the young
and the old. I assume that the generation of the old was born old and
had not a youth. Furthermore, the generation of the young does not have
any progeny. As a consequence, the world ends at time t + 1. Generations
are unlinked, meaning that there is no possibility to leave any bequest.
Individuals consume all the available income earned at a given period of
time; thus, it is not possible neither to save nor to borrow money.
Then, let a population of size equal to one be partitioned into two discrete
groups of workers, the young and the old, each of them endowed with t
hours of time. Thus, the space of groups is G = {Y,O}, where Y denotes
the group of young workers and O the group of old workers. I will use index
I to denote a social group, capital letters to indicate the group and small
letters to indicate single individuals belonging to the I-th group. The size
of a group does not change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his time between work and
leisure, denoted by l. I assume also that leisure can be employed to attend
several activities, such as relaxing, taking care of family, participating in
political activities and many others. Thus, the leisure can be seen as a
vector of N activities l = l(l1, l2, ..., lN ), where ln ≥ 0.
Furthermore, I introduce one of the core assumptions of the model. I
assume that the old and the young are identical in every respect except one:
the intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be greater
than the same value of the young workers. That is, ψo >> ψy, where
Greek letter psi denotes the intrinsic value for leisure. Thus, the two social
groups have different preferences with respect to the choice between work
and leisure. This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence. In
fact, the economic science has produced many works which provide possible
explanations to the existence of a difference in preferences. Moreover, over
the last years, other social sciences like Sociology and Psychology have added
some very useful contributions. This is why I distinguish the economic
reasons from the non-economic reasons.
The economic reasons are summarized in the work by Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin (1999).
Differences in Labor Productivity. Since the labor productivity is declin-
ing in age, the old are less productive than the young and, as a consequence,
they earn a lower wage. This theory would explain the willingness by the
old to retire: less productive workers in the labor market find profitable
to devote relatively more of their time and effort to the political sector as
to gain monetary transfers that they would not get if they relied on labor
market. Nevertheless, for the theory to hold it is important to assume that
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leisure time devoted to political activities is a normal good. That is, an in-
crease in the total leisure time provokes an increase in leisure time devoted
to political activities, due to the income effect.
Differences in Human Capital Accumulation. The young are more en-
gaged in self-financed human capital accumulation while they work than the
old. As a consequence, the value of time for the young may be higher than
their average hourly wage (see Stafford and Duncan [39]).
Long-term employment contracts. The empirical evidence shows that
due to the Lazear-type contracts, labor productivity for workers aged 60+
is significantly lower than wages.
As for the non-economic reasons, I refer to a work by Hershey, Henkens
and Van Dalen [20]. In comparing the Dutch with the U.S. Social Secu-
rity System, the authors discovered that “the Americans had significantly
longer future time perspectives, higher level of retirement goal clarity and
they tended to be more engaged in retirement planning activities”. Thus,
these findings are able to explain the existence of socio-cultural differences
in the preferences for retirement. They go on affirming that “American
workers think, prepare and save more for retirement... beginning in early
adulthood”, focalizing on the difference among societies, where there exists
a major difference in financial responsibility, different level of uncertainty
for future pension payouts and different psychological pressures. Finally,
in concluding that the success of political initiatives depends in part on
“changing the dimensions of the psyche that motivate individuals to adap-
tively prepare for old age”, they implicitly recognize that the preferences
of individuals for leisure may endogenously change over time, again due to
cultural and psychological issues.
Finally, I assume that each worker has a personal ideological bias for one
of the two candidates, and this ideological difference generates heterogeneity
among groups. The ideological bias is exogenously given.
Old workers’ preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility func-
tion2. A representative young worker at time t has the following lifetime
utility function:
Uo = cot + ψ
o log lot (1)
∀ o ∈ O
where cot is the consumption at time t, l
o
t is the leisure at time t and
ψo is a parameter representing the intrinsic preference of the old worker for
leisure (ψo ∈ [0, 1]). The old worker consumes all his income:
cot = w
o(1− τ oLt)(t− lot ) + bot + r(Sot ) (2)
2A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income effect
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where wo is the unitary wage per hour worked, τ oLt is the tax rate on labor in-
come, bot > 0 is an intergenerational transfer and r(S
o
t ) represents the return
which the old worker gains at the end of time t over an amount of money he
accumulated. I assume that the intergenerational transfer is represented by
a typical pay-as-you-go pension program, whilst r(Sot ) represents a quote of
a mutual fund. The last day of work, the old workers withdraw the amount
of money invested. Without loss of generality, we assume that the same day,
the individual consumes all this amount of money and dies.
Similarly, the preferences of a representative young worker y are given
by the following lifetime utility function:
Uy = cyt + ψ
y log lyt + ϕ
y log lot + β
y(cyt+1 + ψ
y log lyt+1) (3)
∀y ∈ Y
where cyt and c
y
t+1 represent the consumption at time t and t+1, l
y
t and
lyt+1 the leisure at time t and t+1, β
y is the time preference discount factor
of the young worker, ψy is the intrinsic preference of the young worker for
leisure (ψy ∈ [0, 1]) and ϕy represents the intrinsic preference of the young
for the leisure of the old (ϕy ∈ [0, 1]). Thus, the leisure of the old represents
a positive externality for the young. This latest assumption is reinforced by
the existence of social beliefs which consider the leisure of the old as a merit
good. In modern societies, individuals believe that the old deserve to retire
after having spent an entire life to work. Furthermore, retired grandparents
often provide their sons with a true help in the children babysitting, in
carrying on some useful activities in sons’ place, such as house cleaning,
payment of bills and so on.
Finally, the intrinsic value of leisure for the old worker is assumed to be
much higher than the intrinsic value for the young: ψo >> ψy. Without
loss of generality I assume that ψo > 12 and ψ
y < 12 Since the young know
that at time t + 1 will be old, their utility function includes the leisure of
the next period, weighted by a discount factor βy ∈ [0, 1].
The young worker’s inter temporal budget constraint is given by:
cyt + β
ycyt+1 = w
y
t (1− τyLt)(t− lyt ) + byt
+r(Syt ) + β
y(wyt+1(t− lyt+1)(1− τyLt+1) + r(Syt+1)) (4)
Notice that the young worker’s budget constraint does not contain the
term which refers to the intergenerational transfer at time t + 1, byt+1 > 0,
since at period t+ 1 there exists only generation Y and it cannot exist any
intergenerational transfer. Furthermore, I introduce the following budget
constraints:
7
r(Sot ) = T
o
t (5)
r(Syt ) = T
y
t (6)
r(Syt+1) = T
y
t (7)
nobot + n
ybyt + α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0 (8)
(bot )(b
y
t ) < 0
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labor supplied, the tax-
ation entails inefficiencies, since it distorts workers’ decisions on the amount
of labor supplied and determines the quota of pre-funded savings.
T ot represents total revenues generated by the taxation of the old at time
t and it is equal to noτ oLtw
o(t− lot ) while T yt the total revenues generated by
the taxation of the young at time t and it is equal to nyτyLtw
y(t− lyt ); T yt+1
represents the total revenues generated by the taxation of the young at time
t + 1 and it is equal to nyτyLt+1w
y(t − lyt+1). The condition nobot + nybyt +
α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0 assures that an intergenerational transfer exists while
the condition (bot )(b
y
t ) < 0 shows that the situation where both generations
either get a positive transfer or suffer of a negative transfer is impossible to
achieve. In other words, if one generation obtains a positive transfer, the
other one has to finance for it. The result is derived by the assumption that
both the transfers must be different from zero; thus, the term α |nobot | |nybyt |
represents an efficiency loss which takes place via a redistribution process
and can be measured by the amount of resources wasted during this process.
For instance, one may think that this loss is due to the existence of burocracy
costs or to rent grabbed by politicians. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents
the measure of the loss which is quadratic in the transfers. To avoid the
case in which a difference in wage levels is the solely responsible for the
existence of retirement I impose that wages are exogenously determined:
wot = w
y
t = w. Furthermore, without loss of generality, I normalize the wage
rate to the unity.
2.1 The Government
The literature has used different formulation for the Government’s objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal
tax rate on labor, subject to a budget constraint where tax revenues are
equal to public good expenditures. Otherwise, some authors such as Ed-
wards and Keen considers a Leviathan model where, referring to the famous
milestone paper by Brennan and Buchanan [5], they examine a Government
which is concerned in part with maximizing the size of the public sector.
Furthermore, the Edwards and Keen model assumes that the Government
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retains some degree of benevolence, perhaps because it has re-election con-
cerns. Nevertheless, this concerns were not formally modeled.
In this paper, I provide a possible explanation to this issue, introducing
a political economy model where politicians act in order to maximize the
probability of being re-elected.
A public policy vector is given by:
~q = (τ oLt, τ
y
Lt, b
o
t , b
y
t )
composed of two tax rates and two intergenerational transfers.
Finally, the Government is committed to clear the budget constraint;
this means that it cannot transfer more resources than those collected by
taxing individuals at every period of time. Thus, I assume that the Budget
Surplus (Deficit) must be equal to zero. Since the Government cannot issue
bonds to collect more financial resources and can only rely on taxation, the
increase in a social group’s welfare entails the decrease in the welfare of the
other social group, since the latter has to pay for the transfer.
2.2 A three-stage game
I consider a three-stage game where two candidates, say A and B, wish to
maximize their number of votes to win elections 3. Both of them have an ide-
ological label (for instance they are seen as “Democrats”or “Republicans”).
I assume that this label is exogenously given.
In the first stage of the game, the two candidates, simultaneously and
independently, announce a policy vector, ~qA and~qB. As in Lindbeck and
Weibull the component of every voter’s welfare depends on fiscal policies
chosen by candidates which affect his consumption and which is known by
both parties, whilst the other component of welfare, which derives from
personal attributes of the candidates, is only imperfectly observed by the
parties. In other words, we are assuming that consumers’ preferences for
consumption are perfectly visible, whilst other political aspects such as ide-
ology are not. The presence of uncertainty is fundamental for existence of an
equilibrium, since in the absence of this assumption, the candidates would
be able to perfectly observe workers’ preferences and then we would have
a discontinuous function. In this case, no equilibrium would exist, for any
policy suggested by a candidate would be beaten by another policy. Indeed,
suppose that Overall preferences of voter i ∈ I may be written as:
U i = V i(~q) + piA(ξi + ζ)
3Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the
Nash equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that
obtained when candidates maximize their probability of winning
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where piA = 1 if candidate A wins the elections and piA = 0 if he loses.
The term ζ reflects the candidate A’s general popularity amongst the elec-
torate. It is not idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed on the interval
(− 12h , 12h) with mean zero and density h. Hence, the voter’s choice is deter-
ministic, and it is a discontinuous function of the utility differential between
the two party vector of policies. Otherwise, the term ξi represents an id-
iosyncratic component of voter’s preferences for candidate A and, assuming
that it cannot be exactly observed by parties and that voters are uniformly
distributed on (− 1
2sI
, 1
2sI
), again with mean zero and density sI . Thus, each
voter in group I votes for candidate A if and only if the candidate A’s pol-
icy vector provides him with a greater utility than that provided by the
candidate B’s policy vector. That is:
V i(~qA) + ζ + ξi > V i(~qB) (9)
The assumption that voters care not only about transfers but also have
unobserved exogenous preferences for one candidate assure the existence
of a Nash equilibrium to the electoral-competition in a multi-dimensional
model, according to Lindbeck & Weibull [27] and Dixit & Londregan [13].
In fact, the social choice theory states a negative result when affirms that
any division of resources among cohorts can be beaten in a pairwise vote by
some other division. The existence of preferences with respect to policies
over which the parties cannot easily change position from election to election,
or evaluations of the parties with respect to characteristics such as honesty
and leadership which are valued by all voters (the so called valence issues)
rules out the non-existence of an equilibrium.
In each social group there are some swing voters, who are those individu-
als that do not have any particular preference for one of the two candidates.
This category of voters is fundamental to evaluate the effect of a change in
the equilibrium policy vector. In fact, suppose to start from a situation of
equilibrium, where the candidate A’s policy, ~qA is exactly equal to the can-
didate B’s policy, ~qB; a candidate knows that, should it deviate from that
policy some swing voters will be better off whilst some other will be worse
off. Thus, in choosing a policy, a candidate should calculate the number
of swing voters which he would gain and compare it with the number of
swing voters he would lose; intuitively, a change in a policy should be made
if and only if a candidate evaluates that the number of swing voters gained
is greater than the number of swing voters lost. Swing voters in group I are
identified with the following expression:
ξi = V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ (10)
This expression affirms that a swing voter is indifferent between candi-
date A and candidate B; otherwise, all the voters with ξjI < ξI vote for
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candidate B and all the voters with ξjI > ξI vote for candidate A. I indicate
the share of votes of candidate A in group I with:
piA =
∑
I
nIsI [ξi +
1
2sI
] (11)
and substituting (10) into (11) I obtain:
piA =
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
(12)
where s ≡ nIsI . Notice that piA is a random variable since it depends on
ζ which is also a random variable. Thus, the candidate A’s probability of
winning is:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)− ζ] + 1
2
≥ 1
2
]
and rearranging the terms I obtain:
A
Pr = Pr[piA ≥ 1
2
] = Pr[
h
s
∑
I
nIsI [V i(~qB)− V i(~qA)] ≥
∑
I
nIsIζ]
Candidate B wins with probability PrB = 1 − PrA. In this model, the
probability of winning is thus a function of the distance between the two
electoral platforms.
Definition 1 A pair (qA∗, qB∗) is called a (pure strategy) Nash equilib-
rium (NE) in the expected-plurality game if E(piA − piB|qA, qB∗) ≤ E(piA −
piB|qA∗, qB∗) ≤ E(piA∗ − piB|qA, qB) for all qA, qB which satisfy the budget
constraint.
In the second stage of the game elections take place. A candidate wins
elections if and only if it obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a
coin is tossed as to choose the Government which will come to power. Fur-
thermore, I assume that each party prefers to stay out from the competition
than to enter and lose, that prefers to tie than stay out and it prefers to win
than to tie.
Another core assumption of the model which affirms that the density of a
social group is endogenously determined and it is a function of the amount of
leisure devoted to political activities. In other words, the higher the leisure
time spent in political activities by a social group, the higher the power of
influence of that group on politicians and the higher the probability of being
successful.
~s = s(~l(l1, l2, ..., lN ))
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Describing more in details the basic elements of the workers’ decision
problem, I assume that the leisure is a vector ~l of N activities which can
be undertaken in the spare time (indexed by n = 1, ..., N). One such activ-
ity is lobbying, which I will denote with lp, which requires some inputs as
knowledge of political situation, telephones and time; The consumption set
is given by: L = <N+ = l ∈ <N : ln ≥ 0 for n=1,...,N where L is convex set.
Each activity can be written as:
li = fi(xi, Ti) (13)
where xi is a vector of inputs which are necessary to undertake the activity
and Ti a vector of time inputs using in performing the activity. The partial
derivatives of li with respect to both xi and Ti are non-negative, that is
∂li
∂xi
≥ 0 and ∂li∂Ti ≥ 0.
The main idea that individuals allocate time between different activities
dates back to Gary Becker’s works ([3]) where households are seen both
as consumers and as producers and the amount of activities undertaken are
determined by maximising a utility function subject to prices and constraints
on resources. The great idea by Becker was considering that consumption
activities full cost is equal to the sum of market prices and the forgone value
of the time used up. Thus, a representative consumer solves the following
maximization problem:
maxU = U(li, ..., ln) = Z(x1, ..., xn;T1, ..., Tn)
subject to
g(l1, ..., ln) = l
where g is an expenditure function of li and l is the bound on resources.
The goods constraint is:
n∑
i=1
pixi = I = V + Tww¯ (14)
where pi is a vector of unit prices, Tw is a vector of hours spent in working
and w¯ is the wage rate per unit of Tw. We have also a time constraint which
can be written as:
n∑
i=1
Ti = Tc = T − Tw (15)
In other words the total available time T may be seen as the sum of total
time devoted to work Tw and total time devoted to consumption activities
Tc which is the sum of time devoted to single consumption activities Ti. Let
us assume now that
Ti ≡ tili (16)
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xi ≡ bili (17)
where ti is a vector giving the input of time per unit of li and bi is a
similar vector for market goods. Substituting (16) into (15), (15) and (17)
into (14) we obtain:
n∑
i=1
(pibi + tiw¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pii
li = V + Tw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
(18)
pii represents the sum of the unitary prices of the goods and of the time
spent for li. Let us now denote the full income (the maximum money income
achievable) by S; this can be seen as the sum of the total labor earnings I
and the total earnings forgone in devoting time to consumption activities L.
Thus:
L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S − I(l1, ..., ln)
which can also be re-written as:
n∑
i=1
pibili + L(l1, ..., ln) ≡ S (19)
The equilibrium conditions resulting from maximising the utility func-
tion subject to (19) are:
Ui = T (pibi + Li) (20)
where pibi is the direct and Li the indirect component of the total marginal
price pibi + Li. Suppose now to denote political activitiy (i.e. lobbying) by
lp and all the other consumption activities with l−p. Figure 1 shows the
equilibrium we find, where the slope of the full income opportunity curve,
which is equal to the marginal prices and would be equal to slope of an
indifference curve (equals to marginal utilities). In Appendix 3 I provide an
alternative microfundation approach.
Furthermore, since the leisure vector directly enter into the density func-
tion It can be seen that:
∂sl(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂l(l1, l2, ..., lN )
∂ln
> 0 (21)
Equation (21) says that the density function is monotonically increas-
ing in leisure devoted to political activities. By the meaning of the chain
rule we can divide the expression in two terms. The first term ∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )∂ln
represents the effect of an increase in leisure devoted to political activities
on total leisure time and it is positive. Otherwise, the term ∂s
l(l1,l2,...,lN )
∂l(l1,l2,...,lN )
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represents the effect of an increase in total leisure on the density function,
which represents an indicator for the group cohesion and for the group po-
litical power. Also this term is positive, since an increase in time devoted
to political activities is likely to increase the power of influence of a group.
In this view the leisure spent by individuals in political activities can be
seen as an investment in time, whose return is represented by the monetary
transfer they get from politicians. The size of the transfer is an increas-
ing function of groups’ density. Thus, I define the transfer b as a function
b = b(sy, so), with b′ > 0 and b′′ < 0. Finally, I assume that b is a despair
function (b = b(sy, so) = −b = b(sy, so)) and that if groups’ density is the
same no transfer occurs; that is sy = so = d∗ implies that b(d∗, d∗) = 0. In
this case, according to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin the two groups have the
same political power.
Summarizing, the endogenous density may be seen as a measure of the
group’s single-mindedness; the higher the density of the group, the higher
the single mindedness and vice versa. This assumption would explain why
those issues or preferences that are more commonly shared by individuals
are politically more successful.
Thus, I conclude that for the single mindedness theory to hold some
requirements must hold:
• the existence of individuals with similar preferences toward one or more
issues;
• the existence of institutions such as lobbies, labor unions or whatever,
where individuals who share similar preferences can unite to increase
their political power and influence politicians;
• the realization that, eventually, social groups which are able to focalize
on the smallest number of issues are more likely to get what they require
and thus to shape Social Security Systems.
Finally, in the third stage of the game, workers choose their work and
leisure level, given the marginal tax rates and transfers chosen by the Gov-
ernment.
2.3 The equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction, starting from the final stage.
A representative old worker solves the following optimization problem:
maxUo = cot + ψ
o log lot
s.t. cot = (1− τ oLt)(t− lot ) + bot + r(Sot )
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Solving with respect to lot I obtain an expression for the optimal labor supply:
lo∗t =
ψo
(1− τ oLt)
(22)
and substituting into (1) I obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility Func-
tion:
V ot = t(1−τ oLt)−ψo+bot+r(Sot )+ψo logψo−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψo logwt−ψo log(1−τ oLt) (23)
I do the same for the representative young worker:
max Uy = cyt + ψ
y log lyt + ϕ
y log lot + β
y(cyt+1 + ψ
y log lyt+1)
s.t. cyt+β
ycyt+1 = (1−τyLt)(t−lyt )+byt+r(Syt )+βy((t−lyt+1)(1−τyLt+1)+r(Syt+1))
ly∗t =
ψy
(1− τyLt)
(24)
V y = t(1−τyLt)−ψy+byt+r(Syt )+ψy logψy−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψy log 1−ψy log(1−τyLt)+ϕy logψo
−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ϕy log 1−ϕy log(1−τ oLt)+βy(t−ψy)(1−τyLt+1)+βyψy(logψy−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
log 1)+βyr(Syt+1)
(25)
2.4 Deriving a formula for the optimal labor taxation
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify that
the elections’ outcome is a tie. The proof arises from the resolution of the
first stage, where it will be demonstrated that in equilibrium, both parties
choose an identical policy vector.
In the first stage, the two candidates choose their policy vectors. They
face exactly the same optimization problem and maximize their share of
votes or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made
for candidate A, but it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
s.t. T1 ≡ r(Sot ) = T ot
T2 ≡ r(Syt ) = T yt
T3 ≡ r(Syt+1) = T yt+1
T4 ≡ nobot + nybyt + α |nobot | |nybyt | = 0
T5 ≡ bot byt < 0
I provide a complete resolution to the problem in the Appendix.
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Proposition 1 In equilibrium both candidates’ policy vectors converge to
the same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q∗
Proof : ~q∗ represents the policy which captures the highest number of
swing voters. Instead, suppose there exists other two policies ~q′ and ~q′′;
in moving from ~q∗ to ~q′ (or ~q′′) a candidate loses more swing voters than
those it is able to gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate
A chooses ~q′ and candidate B chooses ~q′′ such that in choosing ~q′ and ~q′′
the elections outcome is a tie. If one candidate moved toward ~q∗, it would
be able to gain more swing voters than those it loses and thus, it would
win the elections. So, choosing any policy but ~q∗ cannot be an optimal
answer. The only one policy which represents a Nash Equilibrium is ~q∗ since
it is the intersection between the optimal answers of the two candidates
and no one candidate has an incentive to deviate. Since each candidate
maximizes its share of votes, in equilibrium the two candidates receive both
one half of votes; if one candidate should receive less than one half of votes it
would always have the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by the other
candidate and get the same number of votes. Notice that what we found
here is the multidimensional analogue of Hotelling’s principle of minimum
differentiation.
Corollary 1 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is:
V iA = V iB.
Proposition 2 The marginal tax rate on labor is positive for the old and
equal to zero for the young workers. That is, the young workers are taxed
less than the old workers.
Proof : From the First Order Conditions (see Appendix), we obtain:
nysyϕo
1− τ oLt
=
nosoτ oLtψ
o
(1− τ oLt)2
and finally we get an expression for the optimal marginal tax rate of the
old:
τ o∗Lt =
1
1 +m
(26)
with m = n
osoψo
nysyϕo .
The same for the optimal marginal tax rate of the young:
nysy(− τ
y
Ltψ
y
(1− τyLt)2
) = 0
which gives a marginal tax rate equal to zero
τy∗Lt = 0 (27)
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Equations (26) and (27) represent the structure of the optimal taxation
in a political economy framework with social groups characterized by the
presence of swing voters. Furthermore, the comparative statics shows that
∂τoLt
∂no < 0,
∂τoLt
∂so < 0,
∂τoLt
∂ψo < 0,
∂τoLt
∂ny > 0,
∂τoLt
∂sy > 0,
∂τoLt
∂ϕo < 0.
Thus, the political economy framework suggests that tax rates should
be differentiated, since equations (26) and (27) tell us that social groups in
society must be taxed with different tax rates. It also suggests that tax rates
should be lower for those social groups which are more numerous, in turn,
for those social groups who have the highest ability to drive the elections
outcome.
Indeed, if the traditional normative approach suggests that a benvolent
Governments should tax less the poorest social groups, the political econ-
omy approach suggests that in a real world vote-seeker Governments tax
less social groups which are more able to threat politicians in the electoral
competition.
Notice that the result which shows that the old are taxed heavier than the
young is interesting. Usually, one may think that individuals who hold the
greater power in society should be able to be taxed with lower marginal rates.
Instead, this result is completely in syntony with the SMT. Why should the
old accept higher marginal tax rates if they have more political power? The
answer is twofold. First of all, a high tax rate entails a greater pre-funded
savings for the old. Otherwise, the pre-funded savings for the young is equal
to zero, since the marginal tax rate is also equal to zero. This is perfectly
rational; the young prefer to spend their labor income and thus are more
prone to accept lower tax rate, while the old attribute more importance to
the pension transfers, since they will represent the only income once they
retire. Secondly, by assumption, the older attach a higher weight to leisure
than the young; thus, higher tax rates forces them to anticipate retirement
and enjoy leisure. An important conclusion I suggest is that more single
mindedness drives higher tax rates. The explanation is very subtle and
stands in the following terms. The old know that once retired their only
income source is represented by pension transfers. They also know that
to force the Government to increase their pensions, they have to spend a
fraction of their leisure in political activities. At this point, a free-riding
problem arises. If no one incentive did not exist, nobody would voluntary
retire to promote political initiatives, whose benefit would be shared among
all the members of the group. Thus, an incentive is necessary in order to
force the old to retire and this is represented by keeping marginal tax rates
high so that the individual are discouraged to work and prefer to leave the
labor force. Then, I conclude that the old accept higher tax rates as a system
to solve a free-riding problem among the members of the group.
Proposition 3 The old offer a lower supply of labor than the young, due
to the difference between lot and l
y
t .
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Proof : Since τ oLt > τ
y
Lt = 0, and ψ
o >> ψy (by hypothesis), then lo∗t =
ψo
(1−τo
lt
) > l
y∗
t = ψ
y.
Corollary 2 The old workers are more single-minded than the young (so >
sy).
Proof : Since τ oLt > τ
y
Lt = 0 and ψ
o >> ψy then lo∗t > l
y∗
t . Since s is a
positive function of l so = s(lot ) > s
y = s(lyt ).
Proposition 4 There exist Social Security transfers from the young to the
old. That is: bot > 0 and b
y
t < 0.
Proof : From the first order conditions with respect to bot and b
y
t , it is:
so
sy =
1−αnybyt
1−αnobot . From Corollary 2, s
o = s(lot ) > s
ly = s(lyt ) it must be
1 − αlnybyt > 1 − αlnobot for the workers. Since αlnobot > αnybyt , under
conditions bot b
y
t < 0, and α, n
o, ny it must be bot > 0 and b
y
t < 0.
The equilibrium levels of the transfers between the young and the old
are the following:
byt =
1−
√
so
sy
αny
(28)
bot =
1−
√
sy
so
αlno
(29)
byt+1 = 0 (30)
Given the budget constraint: nobot =
−nybyt
1−αnybyt taking into account the
equilibrium conditions s
o
sy =
1−αnybyt
1−αnobot , it is
so
sy =
1−αnybyt
αny
b
y
t
1−αnyby
t
+1
= (1−αnybyt )2.
Solving with respect to byt and b
o
t we obtain the optimal values. Furthermore,
since at time t + 1 only the young generation exists, there does not exist
any intergenerational transfer, by definition. Notice that when densities of
both groups are the same, transfers are equal to zero; that is if so = sy, then
bo = by = 0.
Proposition 5 A transfer in the I-th group decreases with an increase in
the amount of resources distorted by government and with an increase in the
density of the other group, whilst it increases with an increase in the density
of his own group.
Proof : Calculating the total differentials, we obtain:
∂bIt
∂α
< 0
∂bIt
∂sI
> 0
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∂bIt
∂s−I
< 0
Proposition 5 makes sense and spouses the SMT: the higher the homo-
geneity amongst a group, the higher the power of influence of that group on
the Government, and the higher the transfer that the group gets.
Proposition 6 The optimal Lagrange multipliers assume the following val-
ues:
λ∗ =
√
sosy (31)
Proof : λ = n
oso
no−nonyαbyt =
so
1−nyαbyt =
sy
1−noαbot
Substituting the optimal intergenerational transfers value we obtain: λ∗.
The Lagrange multiplier has a political meaning: it represents the in-
crease in the probability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional
dollar available to spend on redistribution.
3 The Altruistic Model
I consider now an altruistic model where the old workers are supposed to
be parents of the young workers and they care of their offspring and the
basic model allows for bequests. A classical altruistic model considers that
households can be represented by a dinasty who is willing to perpetuate
forever. Otherwise, in this framework the dinasty is concerned to survive
only for two periods. With respect to the basic model, I will not consider the
possibility to invest money in a mutual fund, so that the r(SIt ) component
disappears. As a consequence the old worker’s utility function is given by:
Uo = uo + σuy
where σ represents the parents’ marginal benefit of their offspring’s utility,
with 0 < σ < 1. Thus, (1) can be re-written as:
Uo = cot +ψ
o log lot +σ(c
y
t +ψ
y log lyt +ϕ
y log lot +β
y(cyt+1+ψ
y log lyt+1)) (32)
The new budget constraint of the old is:
cot = w
o(1− τ oLt)(t− lot ) + bot − χt (33)
where χt represents the bequest which is left to the next generation. The
new intertemporal budget constraint of the young at time t is:
cyt + β
ycyt+1 = w
y
t (1− τyLt)(t− lyt ) + byt
+βy(χ2t + w
y
t+1(t− lyt+1)(1− τyLt+1) (34)
19
First-order conditions show that the optimal labor supply for the young
is that same, whilst the new optimal labor supply for the old is:
lo∗t =
ψo + σϕy
(1− τ oLt)
(35)
which shows that the higher the parameter which represents the positive
externality the young get from the work of the old, the more the old are
prone to work. The generosity stands right in here: the old are prone to
renounce to their leisure. Furthermore, first-order conditions also shows that
the optimal bequest is given by:
χy =
1
σ
(36)
The optimal tax rates become:
τ o∗lt = 1− ψo − σϕy −
nysyϕy
noso
(37)
τy∗lt = 1− ψy (38)
and the optimal trasfer:
bo∗t =
1
α
(1− 1
k
(39)
by∗t =
1− k
αny
(40)
where k =
√
sony
nosoσ+nssy .
In this case it’s very easy to evaluate that the generosity parameter σ
affects the optimal value of the model. First of all, notice that the parameter
directly enters into the optimal tax rate of the old, decreasing its value; we
can read this result in the following manner: the higher is the generosity of
the old, the lower is the tax they are prone to pay. This is perfectly rational:
indeed, in the previous model the old were willing to be tax more to reduce
their working time and to have more time to lobby; this time their generosity
make them more willing to work as to support the generation of the young
and thus they are willing to be taxed less as not to reduce the labor supply.
We can also see another difference with respect to the previous model, where
the old were able to finance their reduction in labor-income with a higher
intergenerational transfer, whilst now it is easy to verify that the optimal
intergenerational trasfer for the young byt increases with an increase of the
generosity parameter. Thus, the introduction of altruistic variables in the
model framework changes the nature of intergenerational trasfers and favor
the young generation.
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4 Theory and Evidence
In this section I analyse some empirical evidence which supports the sin-
gle mindedness theory. I remind that if the single mindedness theory was
right, we should expect high levels of retirement within the old workers ac-
companied by high marginal tax rates on labor. I will focus on the U.S.
case referring to recent works by Peter Diamond (1997) and Mulligan &
Sala-i-Martin (1999).
4.1 The Unceasing Decrease in Labor Market Participation
Around the World
According to Diamond, the stylized facts would show that the participa-
tion of the older persons in the labor market has been gradually declining
over the 20th century. For instance, in 1950 almost 60% of men age 65-69
partecipated in the labor force, while by 1990 this figure had fallen to 26%.
Otherwise, the percentage of workers covered by SS System has significantly
rose over the same period. There has been also a dramatic increase in the
share of the older population receiving payments from public schemes. Thus,
it seems there would exist a strong linkage between SS System and retire-
ment. To asses this he analysed the hazard rate, defined as the increase in
the rate of labor force leaving from the previous age, relative to the stock
of workers participating at the previous age. The trend, both for males and
females, shows the suggestive existence of two spikes around age 62, the age
of eligibility for early retirement under Social Security and age 65, which is
the legal retirement age. Trying to give an explanation to this phenomenon,
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin note that the Government retirement ages have
not risen with an augmented life expectancy and a bettering in health, since
we would expect the fraction of GDP devoted to public programs for the old
to increase less than one-for-one, because the dead weight losses associated
with SS taxes presumably increases with respect to an increasing rate, while
in the real world this ratio varies exactly one-for-one with the fraction of
the population over age 60. Secondly, the Social Security have mostly pay-
as-you-go features, which means that an intergenerational transfer always
exists. Identical results were achieved by Ruzik ([38]), which analised the
retirement bahaviour in Poland, Hungary and Lithuania; the main result
of the econometric analysis was that becoming unemployed at older age is
a strong factor increasing probability of retirement and that there exists a
strong linkage between retirement and the right to get a social security ben-
efit in advanced age. Aguiar ([1]) tried to go more in details in anlasying the
allocation of time; he confirmed results obtained by previous literature that
leisure time has increased significantly in the United States over the last
five decades, but he made a further effort to disaggregate uses of household
time into specific categories, namely market work time, non-market time
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and leisure time. The market work time is represented by a core market
work (main jobs, second jobs, overtime, time spent working at home) plus
time spent commuting to/from work and time spent on ancillary work ac-
tivities (i.e. meating a meal); the study shows that this category has been
remaining costant between 1965 and 2003 even though with a difference
between men and women work. The non-market work encompasses activ-
ities such as household activities (i.e. cleaning, ironing, vacuuming), time
spent obtaining goods and services (i.e. shopping) and time spent on other
home production (i.e. gardening, vehicle repair). In this case, time spent in
these activities has fallen sharply over the same period of time. Otherwise,
leisure time, consisiting in the residual of work activities has been increased
significanlty. Huovinen and Piekkola ([22], in a study on early retirement
and time use of older Finns, argued that factors related to labor demand, in
addition to personal financial incentives and health, are very important in
determining the early retirement in Finland and that changes in how leisure
time is valued explain the level of withdrawal from labor market. Finally
Dorn & Sousa-Poza ([9]), analysing early retirement in Switzerland, discov-
ered that early retirement positively depends on the level of wealth, the level
of education, a negative attitude toward the job, preferences toward leisure
and retirement incentives provided by firms. Thus, it seems that an hihg
level of accomulated wealth entails a higher probability to retire. Table 1
shows the dramatic decline in the employment of older workers as a fraction
of male populations which occured in some OECD countries over the last
five decades. Except Japan, partecipation rates have been declining from
above 80 percent to below 50 percent.
Table 1 - Employment of male workers at age 55 to 64 as a percentage of
male populations of the same age
1980 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 47.7 34.3 34.5 35, 1
Canada 71.3 60.3 53.7 57.7
France 65.3 43.0 38.4 38.5
Germany 64.1 52.0 48.2 48.2
Japan 82.2 80.4 80.8 78.4
United Kingdom 62.6 62.4 56.1 59.8
United States 69.7 65.2 63.6 65.6
Source: Fenge & Pestieau (2005)
4.1.1 Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced Decision?
As we have demonstrated in the previous point, retirement data show a
clear downward trend in labor market participation. A natural question
arises: do people voluntarely retire earlier or are they forced to retire from
labor market conditions? This question has not an easy answer since would
require a perfect knowledge about individual preferences which we do not
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have. Nevertheless, answering this question is fundamental to understand
how workers react to a change in social security system variables, such as
an increase in the legal retirement age, the transition from a PAYG System
to a Fully Funded System or any other pension reform. The imporance of
being able to answer this question is highlighted by the following example:
imagine to introduce a policy which aims to supply education to the elder
workers; if their preferences are such that they only desire to retire to enjoy
more leisure time, rather than work, probably these measures would not be
much effective; otherwise, suppose retirements take place due to labor mar-
ket reasons (i.e. a negative economic trend which forces firms to incentive
workers exodous, bad perception about the ability to permorm a job and
so forth); in this case a good intervention by Governments in Social Secu-
rity policies would stimulate workers to withdraw from earlier retirement.
Strange enough, the economic literature has not been focusing so much over
this issue. The main stream of literature on early-retirement believes that to
understand workers’ retirement decisions, we must focus on the labor-supply
side; the main evidence this theory achieved is that earlier and more gener-
ous availability of public old-age benefits (or more generous early retirement
regulations) tend to increase early exits form the labor market, since early
retirement becomes a more attractive choice for individuals. Thus, labor-
supply economists believe that early retirement is more a free choice than
a forced decision. Empirical evidence about the retirement incentives (see
Fenge & Pastieu ([17]), Coile and Gruber ([6] and Gruber and Wise ([19])
among the others) found that retirement incentives are strongly related to
early retirement, that most wealthy people, that is people who would have
more opportunities to continue to work,are more likely to retire early and
that persons are more likely to prefer retirement to work as they get hold
Otherwise, the labor-demand side perspective has not received the same at-
tention and only in more recent years with Hutchens ([?]) has gained interest
among economists. In this case, early retirement is seen more as a forced
decision than a free choice.
4.1.2 Are preferences for leisure of the old higher than those of
the young?
In the model I assumed that the intrinsic preference for leisure of the old
were higher than that of the young (ψo > ψy). This assumption is the most
difficult to verify, since it entails a complete knowledge about preferences
of individuals which actually we do not have. Thus, this evaluation must
take place adopting indirect proxies. A study by McGrattan & Rogerson
([28]) analysed changes in hours worked since 1950 for different demographic
groups. They discovered that despite the average weekly hours worked per
person at the aggregate level has not substantially changed over the period
and college enrollments over the monitored period increased, the number of
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weekly hours worked by individuals aged 15-24 increased nearly 10 percent
and the number of hours worked by individuals aged 25-54 increased about
20 percent; otherwise, work hours of people aged 55-64 fell 6.5 percent and
those of people aged 65-74 fell 57 percent. Thus, it seems that U.S. labor
market has experimented a reallocation of hours worked among cohorts4.
This result seems to confirm our assumption: the young prefer to work,
although they have to invest in human capital while they are under 30,
whilst the old over 50 prefer to retire. Despite the classical motivations the
literature has brought to explain this phenomenon, it seems there also exist
a “natural”tendency to retire soon after the middle age. In a next paper
I will try to give a game theoretic explanation to this point adopting an
evolutionary game theory model.
4.1.3 How do retirees use their leisure?
In the model I assumed that the the old have a higher level of preference
for leisure than the young (ψo >> ψy) and I provided some theories which
may support this hypothesis. The empirical evidence seems to confort the-
oretical results. Huovinen and Piekkola suggest that leisure allocation is a
highly significant factor explaining retirement decisiona and that not only
the overall increase in leisure time makes retirement more attractive but
also the way this increased leisure is allocated. Results of the survey shown
that the share of more active activities is higher amongst the non-employed,
while passive activities (i.e. watching television, reading books and so forth)
is higher amongst the empoloyed. In my opinion, an interesting considera-
tion stated in this study is the actively used leisure time works a substitute
for decreased income to work
4.2 SS System and Marginal Tax Rates
If we take into account the time pattern of tax/subsidy rates across earning
groups, we would see that before age 62 the tax rate is higher, the higher
is the wage earned by workers. For instance, consider a single worker with
a last year of work equal to 55; the tax rate is equal to 4.3%. Consider
again a single worker, but this time with a last year of work equal to 69;
this time, the tax rate is equal to 44.2%. Finally, to discourage working,
some countries tax the labor income of the elderly at 100% rates. Some
example are derived from Spain and Belgium where “elderly are not allowed
to collect their government pension if they earn any labor income at all
and those benefits are typically close to or more than what the pensioner
would have earned after taxes if he had kept working ”. Otherwise, France
4monitoring disaggregate data among cohorts was essential to challange the classical
theory by Prescott, who sustained looking at aggregate values that elasticity of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure was near 1
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“allows pensioners to receive labor income, but not from their preretirement
occupation ”. Furthermore, the authors evaluate that the size of the public
pension benefits in some countries are nearly the size of the average worker’s
earnings and thus the range of income to which the 100% implicit tax rate is
very large. But the most effective explanation for the high tax rate applied
on the old refers to the free riding problem within a group. In this view,
considering selfish individuals who does not care about interests of other
members, the existence of high tax rates on labor income could be seen as a
measure undertaken by the group itself to overcome the free-riding threat;
thus, it would be the group itself which forces the Government to impose
high tax rates in order to induce members to retire so that they can spend
some additional leisure time in political activities to protect the group’s
interests.
4.3 The Political Economy of Early Retirement
The recent trend which refers to early retirement is something of unaccept-
able from a normative perspective. How can we justify policies which favour
early retirement, when due to demographical causes and financial troubles
the actual social security systems are universally considered unsustainable?
The theory says that to meet financing problems and improvements in
longevity the retirement age should be raised. Actually answers should be
found in the political economy. According to recent studies (see Jacobs and
Shapiro ([23]), Ferrera ([14]), and Boeri,Borsch-Supan, and Tabellini ([4])) it
seems that both in the U.S. and in Europe the majority of people are against
higher payroll taxes, lower benefits, and a higher retirement age. Surveys
show that European citizens are neither happy with the existing programs
nor willing to reform the welfare state. Even though the evidence about the
political economy of early retirement seems to be clear and robust, we still
lack of models which are able to explain the phenomenon. Even recent mod-
els (see Fenge & Pestieau ([17])) seems to suffer to mispecification problems;
indeed in the model of political choice, individuals vote on a mandatory age
of retirement, maximising a lifetime utility function where the age of retire-
ment negativly affects the utility of voters. This seems incorrect, because an
higher retirement age increases the monetary value of consumption; that is,
consumption is a function of time spent in working. Furthermore, consump-
tion is a monetary variable while the age of retirement is a time variable
and, again, it seems quite incorrect to sum a monetary variable with a time
variable. Finally, the model does not take into account the value of leisure,
which is in my opinion the key point to understand the political economy of
early retirement. In fact, an higher age of retirement increases the mone-
tary value of total consumption, but decreases the value of total leisure. To
understand why voters seem to be unwilling to increase the retirement age
we have to find answers in individual preferences. If we assume that working
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more means to have less leisure, as it is obvious, than people do not accept
to work more simply because the monetary value of the consumption due to
an increase in working time is lower than the monetary value of leisure. It
is not the age of retirement per se who reduces the individual’s utility but
the reduced values of total leisure which an increase in the retirement age
produces, instead.
4.4 Policy Implications of the altruistic model: some sugges-
tions
The basic model I analysed is basically one in which two selfish group face
each other and try to get the best from politicians. If the old are the moe
single-minded group and do not care about society’s welfare, they will end
up with a greater amount of leisure which take the shape of early retirement
financed by the social transfers borne by the young. This, obviously, sounds
really unfair and unequal for the next generations of worker, because the gen-
eral level of social security spending increases (and the total public spendig
as well). This could lead to an increase in the poverty level amongst younger
workers and to an unsustainability of the public finance. In a nutshell, the
selfishness of the old translates in a reduction of the general welfare, expe-
cially that of the future generations. The situation would improve if the old
would be more generous with respect to the younger generation, internaliz-
ing the young group’s needs. If they voluntarely reduced the total amount
of their leisure working more, they would reduce both the ratio of early
retired in the economy with all the beneficial consequences, in primis the
reduction of social security spending and (most important) an increase in
the sustainibility of the public finance. Unfortunately, the elder components
of society hardly accept this vision and share this willingness to support an
effort in increasing their total amount of hours worked. Otherwise, often
there exists in society a common vision of pensions benefits as a merit good,
a sort of untouchable right which the old deserve. In my opinion this vision
has generated a bias towards what the present generation needs with respet
to the future generation. The creation of formalized inter-generational pacts
could represent a possible solution to all the imbalances previously discussed
togheter with an increase in the fairness of pension systems.
5 Conclusions
I introduced a political economy model which analysis the optimal taxation
problem when candidates are supposed to be voter seekers which aim to
maximize the probability to win elections in a society characterized by dif-
ferent social groups. I derived the optimal taxation structure in a framework
characterized by overlapping generations; I demonstrated that the optimal
taxation on labor depends on the numerosity, density and single-mindedness
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of groups. One of the most interesting conclusion the model achieves states
that eventually the old receive a net transfer from the young. I suggested
also a counter-intuitive result: the marginal tax rate levied on the old is
higher than that levied on the young, which is equal to zero. Although this
result is surprising, I demonstrated that it is perfectly rational in a political
economy model based on the SMT: the old group forces candidates to ele-
vate their marginal tax rates because they recognize that this is a way which
enables them to solve a free-riding problem between members of the group,
who are forced to leave the labor market and to start the lobbying activity
once they retire. I also analyzed the consequences of an altruistic model,
where the old take care of the welfare of the young. In such a framework, the
old internalizes the preferences of the young in their utility funcion and, as a
consequence, tend to reduce their leisure. Finally, I demonstrated that this
surprising result actually holds also in reality; the U.S. situation shows that
the retirement age has increasingly reduced over the last decades; further-
more, the implicit marginal tax rate on labor was evaluated to be very high
especially for the old and low-wage workers. Nevertheless, studies on the ap-
plication of the single mindedness theory to the labor market are at the very
beginning and they open new interesting fields of research. This model is far
from being able to explain the relationship between social groups’ behavior
and labor market characteristics. For instance, it would be interesting to
analyse more in details the role of institutions, such as labor unions or asso-
ciation of retirees on the political outcome (I will study this issue in a future
work); another field of research could study the conflicts among unions and
employers endogenizing the bargaining power of the two social groups ac-
cording to the single mindedness theory’s assumptions. Finally, this model
does not take into account any issue which refers to savings; it would be
useful to analyse the effect of savings in different pensions schemes, such as
the PAYG or the Fully-Funded systems. I hope that these issues could be
analyzed in future works.
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7 Appendix
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidates’ problem. The two
candidates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes
or, equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but
it also holds for candidate B.
max piA =
1
2
+
h
s
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)]
s.t. T1 ≡ r(Sot ) = T ot
T2 ≡ r(Syt ) = T yt
T3 ≡ r(Syt+1) = T yt+1
T4 ≡ nobot + nybyt + α |nybyt | |nobot | = 0
T5 ≡ bot byt < 0
where: sI = sI(l(τLt, w)
I substitute T1, T2 and T3 into the IUF of individuals and I write the Lagrangian function:
L =
1
2
+
∑
I={o,y}
nIsI [V i(~qA)− V i(~qB)] + λ (T4)
I obtain the following first order conditions:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ no ∂so
∂L
∂L
∂τo
Lt
(V oA − V oB) + noso( ∂V o
∂τo
Lt
) + nysy( ∂V
y
∂τo
Lt
) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ ny ∂sy
∂L
∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
(V yA − V yB) + nysy( ∂V y
∂τ
y
Lt
) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
λ ≥ 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOC’s can be re-written in the following
manner:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso( ∂V o
∂τo
Lt
) + nysy( ∂V
y
∂τo
Lt
) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy( ∂V y
∂τ
y
Lt
) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
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λ ≥ 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso(−t+ ψo
(1−τo
Lt
)
− τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1−τo
Lt
)2
+ (t− ψo
(1−τo
Lt
)
)) + n
ysyϕo
(1−τo
Lt
)
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy(−t+ ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)
− τ
y
Lt
ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)2
+ (t− ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)
)) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
λ ≥ 0
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso(− τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1−τo
Lt
)2
) + n
ysyϕo
(1−τo
Lt
)
= 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy(− τ
y
Lt
ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)2
) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ so = λ(1− nyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ sy = λ(1− noαbot )
λ ≥ 0
From FOC (1) we obtain:
nysyϕo
1− τoLt
=
nosoτoLtψ
o
(1− τoLt)2
and finally we get an expression for the optimal marginal tax rate for the old:
τoLt =
1
1 +m
with m = n
osoψo
nysyϕo
From FOC (2) it is easy to verify that the optimal marginal tax rate for the young is
equal to zero.
8 Appendix 2
In this Appendix I show that the single mindedness theory assures the existence of a
positive transfer from the young workers to the old workers even in the absence of a pos-
itive externality in the utility of the young generated by the leisure of the old (i.e. when
ϕy = 0). I write again the first order conditions to the maximization problem of candi-
dates which has not changed:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ no ∂so
∂L
∂L
∂τo
Lt
(V oA − V oB) + noso( ∂V o
∂τo
Lt
) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ ny ∂sy
∂L
∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
(V yA − V yB) + nysy( ∂V y
∂τ
y
Lt
) = 0
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(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
λ ≥ 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOC’s can be re-written in the following
manner:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso( ∂V o
∂τo
Lt
) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy( ∂V y
∂τ
y
Lt
) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
λ ≥ 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso(−t+ ψo
(1−τo
Lt
)
− τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1−τo
Lt
)2
+ (t− ψo
(1−τo
Lt
)
)) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy(−t+ ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)
− τ
y
Lt
ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)2
+ (t− ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)
)) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ noso = λ(no − nonyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ nysy = λ(ny − nynoαbot )
λ ≥ 0
(1) ∂L
∂τo
Lt
≡ noso(− τ
o
Ltψ
o
(1−τo
Lt
)2
) = 0
(2) ∂L
∂τ
y
Lt
≡ nysy(− τ
y
Lt
ψy
(1−τy
Lt
)2
) = 0
(3) ∂L
∂bo
t
≡ so = λ(1− nyαbyt )
(4) ∂L
∂b
y
t
≡ sy = λ(1− noαbot )
λ ≥ 0
It is easy to verify, from Foc’s (1) and (2) that both the marginal tax rate are equal
to zero. Thus, neither the old nor the young workers invest in pre-funded pension shemes.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of distorsive taxation, the leisure of the old is still higher
than the leisure of the young, due to the difference in the parameter ψ; again, the older
result to be more single minded of the young, and from Foc’s (3) and (4) we can easily
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verify that the intergenerational transfers are exactly the same as before. Indeed, the old
receive a positive transfer which is financed by the old. Unlikely the previous case, the
young does not get any benefit from the leisure of the old. They are worse off while the
old are better off. A Pareto improvment is impossible to achieve, since if the Government
desires to win elections cannot reduce the amount of resources from the young to the old;
otherwise it would lose swing voters in the group of the old and eventually it would lose
the political competition.
9 Appendix 3
Suppose that individuals’ preferences are represented by the following function:
Λ = U(c) + V (p) (41)
with U1, V1 > 0 and U11, V11 < 0 c represents a basket of market goods and p represents
the political activity non-market good, which is produced according to a CRTS production
function
p = H(l, d) = dH(
l
d
, 1) (42)
with H1, H2 > 0 and H11, H22 < 0. H is a standard function, d represents purchased
inputs to undertake political activities and l is time spend in political activities. The fixed
quantity of the worker input sells at the price c, again measured in terms of time. Suppose
now that the worker has a total amount of time T (which I normalize to the unity) he can
divide between working in the labor market for a market wage rate equal to w or using to
undertake political activities. Define the function:
X(l, d) = V (dH(
l
d
, 1)) (43)
Now, according to Paretian definitions, define l and p as complements when X12 > 0 and
substitutes when X12 > 0. the individual’s maximization problem is
5:
max
l
U(w(t− l)− cw) +X(l, d) (44)
First Order Conditions are given by:
V1(dH(
l
d
,1))H1(
l
d
,1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) −wU1(w(t− l)− cw) = 0 (45)
First order conditions state that the gain due to an extra unit of time spent in polical
activities (X1(l, d) > 0) is offset by the loss in terms of foregone utility in labor market
(wU1(w(t − l) − cw)). Figure 2 shows the solution for l when l and d are complements,
while Figure 3 shows hte solution for l when l and d are substitutes. Thus if we suppose
that inputs to perform political activities are complements of time spent in these activities,
we assist to an increase in leisure time devoted to non-market work. An increase in time
spend in political activities requires a decrease in time spent in working. To evaluate
whether l and d are complements or substitutes we analyse the following expression:
marginalbenefitoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
X1(l, d) =
marginalutilityofpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
V1(dH(
l
d
, 1)) ×
marginalproductoftimespentinpoliticalactivity︷ ︸︸ ︷
H1(
l
d
, 1)
5note the second order conditions entails w2U11 +X11 < 0
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Notice that
∂V1(dH(
l
d
,1))
∂d
< 0, whilst
∂H1(
l
d
,1)
∂d
> 0. ThusX12 = −V11H21 ( ld )− V1H11 ld2 + V11HH1
which depends on whether the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to
the time-goods ratio −( l
d
)H11
H1
is smaller or larger than the elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to the political activity −pV11
V1
, weighted by share of purchased inputs in
output,
d(H−H1l
d
)
p
.
Example 1
Suppose:
U(c) = γ ln(c)
V (p) = (1− γ) ln(p)
The “technology ”used by worker to produce the political activity exploits a CES pro-
duction function H(l, d) = (dρ + lρ)
1
ρ and the worker’s budget constraint is given by
c = w(t− l − c). Thus, the worker maximization problem can be written as:
max
l
γ lnw + γ ln(t− l − c) + (1− γ) ln(dρ + lρ) 1ρ
which entails the following first order conditions:
γ
1− γ =
t− l − c
dρ + lρ
lρ−1
which is independent from the wage rate, since the increased opportunity cost of the
political activity substitution effect is offset by the fact that higher wages make the worker
wealthier income effect.
Example 2 - Effects of labor income taxation
Take now the setup from Example 1 but now U(c) = ln(c− ς) and c = (1− τ)w(1− l) + t
where τ represents the labor income taxation and t a positive lump-sum transfer which is
a fraction θ of taxes collected by Government whose budget is g + t = τw(t− l). Solving
the problem we obtain the following first order condition:
(1− τ)w
c− ς = 1
c = [1− τ(1− θ)]w(t− l)
and finally:
t− l = 1− τ
[1− τ(1− θ)] +
ς
w[1− τ(1− θ)]
Three case arise:
1. ς = 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ tax rate does not affect hours worked.
2. ς = 0 and θ = 1 ⇒ higher tax rates reduce hours worked since only substitution
effect holds.
3. ς > 0 and θ = 0 ⇒ higher tax rated increrase hours worked since the (negative)
income effect more than offset the (positive) substitution effect.
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